home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Complete Home & Office Legal Guide
/
Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO
/
stat
/
ussct
/
patron2.asc
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-08-01
|
42KB
|
727 lines
Economy of Machine Politics, 4 Corruption and Reform 15, 30
(1989) (reporting that Mayor Daley ``sacked'' a black committee-
man for briefly withholding support for a school board nominee
whom civil rights activists opposed)).
Of course, we have firmly rejected any requirement that ag-
grieved employees ``prove that they, or other employees, have
been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their
political allegiance.'' Branti, 445 U. S., at 517. What is at
------
issue in these cases is not whether an employee is actually
coerced or merely influenced, but whether the attempt to obtain
his or her support through ``party discipline'' is legitimate.
To apply the relevant question to JUSTICE SCALIA's example, post,
----
at 18, the person who attempts to bribe a public official is
guilty of a crime regardless whether the official submits to
temptation; likewise, a political party's attempt to maintain
loyalty through allocation of government resources is improper
regardless whether any employee capitulates.
More importantly, it rests on the long-rejected fallacy that a
privilege may be burdened by unconstitutional conditions. See,
e. g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). There are
- - ----- ----------
a few jobs for which an individual's race or religion may be
relevant, see Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S.
------ ------- ----- -- ---------
267, 314-315 (1986) (dissenting opinion); there are many jobs for
which political affiliation is relevant to the employee's ability
to function effectively as part of a given administration. In
those cases--in other words, cases in which ``the efficiency of
the public service,'' Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75,
------ ------- --------
101 (1947), would be advanced by hiring workers who are loyal to
the Governor's party--such hiring is permissible under the hold-
ings in Elrod and Branti. This case, however, concerns jobs in
----- ------
which race, religion, and political affiliation are all equally
and entirely irrelevant to the public service to be performed.
When an individual has been denied employment for an impermissi-
ble reason, it is unacceptable to balance the constitutional
rights of the individual against the political interests of the
party in power. It seems to me obvious that the government may
not discriminate against particular individuals in hopes of ad-
vancing partisan interests through the misuse
of public funds.
The only systemic consideration permissible in these cir-
cumstances is not that of the controlling party, but that of the
aggregate of burdened individuals. By impairing individuals'
freedoms of belief and association, unfettered patronage prac-
tices undermine the ``free functioning of the electoral pro-
cess.'' Elrod, 427 U. S., at 356. As I wrote in 1972:
-----
Indeed, when numbers are considered, it is appropriate not
merely to consider the rights of a particular janitor who may
have been offered a bribe from the public treasury to obtain
his political surrender, but also the impact on the body poli-
tic as a whole when the free political choice of millions of
public servants is inhibited or manipulated by the selective
award of public benefits. While the patronage system is de-
fended in the name of democratic tradition, its paternalistic
impact on the political process is actually at war with the
deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amend-
ment.'' Lewis, 473 F. 2d, at 576.
-----
The tradition that is relevant in this case is the American
commitment to examine and reexamine past and present practices
against the basic principles embodied in the Constitution. The
inspirational command by our President in 1961 is entirely con-
sistent with that tradition: ``Ask not what your country can do
for you--ask what you can do for your country.'' This case in-
volves a contrary command: ``Ask not what job applicants can do
for the State--ask what they can do for our party.'' Whatever
traditional support may remain for a command of that ilk, it is
plainly an illegitimate excuse for the practices rejected by
the Court today.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY
join, and with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins as to Parts II and
III, dissenting.
--
Today the Court establishes the constitutional principle that
party membership is not a permissible factor in the dispensation
of government jobs, except those jobs for the performance of
which party affiliation is an ``appropriate requirement.'' Ante,
----
at 1. It is hard to say precisely (or even generally) what that
exception means, but if there is any category of jobs for whose
performance party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement,
it is the job of being a judge, where partisanship is not only
unneeded but positively undesirable. It is, however, rare that a
federal administration of one party will appoint a judge from
another party. And it has always been rare. See Marbury v.
-------
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, the new principle that the
-------
Court today announces will be enforced by a corps of judges (the
Members of this Court included) who overwhelmingly owe their of-
fice to its violation. Something must be wrong here, and I sug-
gest it is the Court.
The merit principle for government employment is probably the
most favored in modern America, having been widely adopted by
civil-service legislation at both the state and federal levels.
But there is another point of view, described in characteristi-
cally Jacksonian fashion by an eminent practitioner of the pa-
tronage system, George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall:
``I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some arguments
that nobody can answer.
``First, this great and glorious country was built up by pol-
itical parties; second, parties can't hold together if their
workers don't get offices when they win; third, if the parties
go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces,
too; fourth, then there'll be hell to pay.'' W. Riordon, Plunk-
itt of Tammany Hall 13 (1963).
It may well be that the Good Government Leagues of America were
right, and that Plunkitt, James Michael Curley and their ilk were
wrong; but that is not entirely certain. As the merit principle
has been extended and its effects increasingly felt; as the Boss
Tweeds, the Tammany Halls, the Pendergast Machines, the Byrd
Machines and the Daley Machines have faded into history; we find
that political leaders at all levels increasingly complain of the
helplessness of elected government, unprotected by ``party dis-
cipline,'' before the demands of small and cohesive interest-
groups.
The choice between patronage and the merit principle--or, to be
more realistic about it, the choice between the desirable mix of
merit and patronage principles in widely varying federal, state,
and local political contexts--is not so clear that I would be
prepared, as an original matter, to chisel a single, inflexible
prescription into the Constitution. Fourteen years ago, in Elrod
-----
v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), the Court did that. Elrod was
----- -----
limited however, as was the later decision of Branti v. Finkel,
------ ------
445 U. S. 507 (1980), to patronage firings, leaving